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Based on qualitative research conducted 
in Lebanon and Turkey in 2018, this paper 
centers on Syrian women working in vari-
ous civil society organizations (CSOs) in 
the Syrian post-2011 context. It examines 
conflict and host-context impacts on 
Syrian women’s participation in CSOs. 
Using an intersectional framework 
derived from feminist studies, it argues 
that gender, socioeconomic status and 
ethnic/national identity are key intersect-
ing social markers that influence the abil-
ity of Syrian women to participate in CSOs 
in these countries. Findings also demon-
strate the value of intersectional 
approaches in improving our current 
understanding of discriminatory practices 
against Syrian women in civil society.   
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Introduction
Entering its tenth year, the Syrian civil war 
continues to produce the largest global 
mass displacement of our time. According 
to UNHCR, 5.6 million Syrians have fled 
their homeland seeking refuge in neigh-
boring countries since 2011, while 6.6 mil-
lion are internally displaced. They rely on 
assistance from the world’s “humanitarian 
club,” the collective of Western donors, 
United Nations (UN) agencies, and inter-
national non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) (Dixon et al. 110) and support from 
growing numbers of host organizations 
and those of Syrian civil society (CSOs).  
In times of conflict, women from civil soci-
ety play a key role in achieving peace and 
creating more gender-inclusive postwar 
societies (Mazurana and Proctor 24; 
Bhattacharya 233; Bell and O’Rourke 300; 
Colvin 334; Manchanda 4743; D. K. Singh 
658). Post-2011 literature claims that the 
participation of Syrian women in civil soci-
ety has increased (Williamson 3; Fourn 11) 
but remains restricted to lower organiza-
tional levels (Abu-Assab and Nasser-Eddin 
9; Al-Zoua’bi and Iyad 7). Syrian CSOs 
before the war exhibited the same gender 
inequality in leadership. In 2010, although 
equal numbers of men and women were 
employed in Syrian CSOs, only 13 percent 
of leadership positions were held by 
women (Al-Khoury et al. 13).1 This under-
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representation implies that female per-
spectives are lacking in organizations 
working to assist primarily women and 
children in a war context. 
“Humanitarian club” funding with its ability 
to direct the global development agenda 
(Dixon et al. 110) transfers neoliberal 
notions of gender equality into local CSO 
structures and projects (Abu-Assab and 
Nasser-Eddin 21; Fourn 16;  Al-Zoua’bi and 
Iyad 23). Conflict itself influences women’s 
traditional gender roles 2 enabling them to 
overcome exclusionary practices and 
access male-dominated activities in public 
spaces, assume new roles as heads of 
households, and increase civic and politi-
cal engagement (Buvinic et al. 112). 
Since the conflict began, few studies have 
addressed the post-2011 participation of 
Syrian women in civil society. This paper 
addresses this gap for Syrian women 
working in international, host and Syrian 
CSOs in Turkey and Lebanon after the war. 
It attempts to answer the following ques-
tions: How has the ongoing Syrian conflict 
and host-country context influenced the 
participation of Syrian women in CSOs? 
Which key social markers intersect with 
gender in each context and limit this par-
ticipation? 
Studies on gender inequalities in Syrian 
civil society, such as Rabo’s Gender, State 
and Civil Society in Jordan and Syria often 
focus on gender aspects. Abu-Assab and 
Nasser-Eddin , for example, attribute the 
Syrian women’s leadership and deci-
sion-making exclusion in Syrian CSOs to 
gender insensitivities in the CSOs and to 
mirroring existing societal gender hierar-
chies at the workplace (9). Similarly, 
humanitarian-aid discourses treat Syrian 
women affected by the conflict as a single 
category, vulnerable and needing further 
empowering or awareness (Couldrey and 
Peebles 34). This homogenization lacks 
contextual analysis and ignores the influ-
ence of other factors such as class and 
rural/urban origins on Syrian women’s 
positionalities.  
This paper is the first to apply an intersec-
tional approach derived from African-
American feminist studies in the latest 
work by Hill Collins and Bilge, 
Intersectionality, to identify social markers 
influencing Syrian women’s ability to par-
ticipate in civil society. Intersectional 
approaches critique earlier feminist theo-
ries that assumed all women shared a 
common reality (Campbell and Wasco 
781; Kiguwa 227). Systems of oppression 
are regarded as interlocking; race, class 
and gender are key social markers 
involved in defining African-American 
women’s realities. Ever since then numer-
ous feminist researches have examined 
intersections of gender with other factors 
such as age, dis/abilities, ethnicity, nation-
ality, academic status, space and geopo-
litical location, settler colonialism, sexual-
ity, language and legal status (Kiguwa 
228; López et al. and Chavez 5). 
This paper argues that the ongoing con-
flict situation in Syria and resulting dis-
placement have triggered changes in the 
traditional gender roles of Syrian women 
and increased their participation in civil 
society. In the context of Turkey and 
Lebanon, the intersectional analysis 
reveals that gender, socioeconomic status 
and ethnic/national identity are key inter-
secting social markers influencing the abil-
ity of Syrian women to participate in CSOs, 
placing them in varying positions of privi-
lege or disadvantage. 
Findings are based on qualitative research 
conducted by the author during her doc-
toral field research in 2018.  Data was col-
lected through 80 in-depth interviews 
conducted by the author with Syrian 
women and men in host, Syrian, and inter-
national CSOs, in addition to expert inter-
views with government, academic and 
research institutions in both countries.  
To contextualize findings, this paper 
begins by outlining the current conditions 
of Syrians and Syrian CSOs in Lebanon 
and Turkey, the two countries hosting the 
greatest numbers of Syrian refugees. The 
following sections will illustrate in greater 
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depth how the conflict and identified 
social markers influence Syrian women’s 
current civil-society participation in these 
countries.
A Precarious Existence: Living Conditions 
of Syrians in Lebanon & Turkey
According to UNHCR, Turkey presently 
hosts an estimated 3.7 million Syrian refu-
gees and Lebanon one million ever since 
Syrians first began crossing borders in 
April 2011 to escape the civil war. These 
refugees are unable to claim rights 
awarded by the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 protocol, a fact with serious 
implications for their living conditions, 
rights and future prospects. Turkey is sig-
natory to the convention, but with a geo-
graphical limitation granting asylum rights 
exclusively to European refugees (Chatty 
21), while Lebanon has refrained from 
signing the convention to avoid any legal 
obligations toward Palestinian refugees 
living in Lebanon since 1948 (Shamieh 55).
From the outset, the governments of 
Lebanon and Turkey adopted contrasting 
strategies for managing the refugee crisis. 
Lebanon granted Syrians six-month visas 
based on existing bilateral agreements 
(Kabbanji and Kabbanji 14) and shifted 
responsibility for the refugees to CSOs 
and international organizations, particu-
larly UNHCR, all of which became the 
main providers of health, education and 
livelihood assistance (Janmyr 4; Civil 
Society Knowledge Centre, “Formal 
Informality, Brokering Mechanisms, and 
Illegality” 15). Turkey adopted an open-
door policy under the framework of “tem-
porary protection” (İçduygu et al. 452). It 
took over UNHCR’s responsibility for 
determining refugee status (Woods 12) 
and shouldered full responsibility for the 
refuges by applying a non-camp and gov-
ernment-financed approach that encour-
aged self-settlement outside the govern-
ment-built refugee camps (World Bank 2; 
Chatty 20). New laws were introduced to 
address Syrian refugees’ rights in 2013/14. 
Syrian refugees were granted guest status 
and placed under a newly established 
General Directorate of Migration 
Management (GDMM). Their access to 
health care and education was formalized. 
They were also permitted to work in 
defined sectors and to register their busi-
nesses (İçduygu et al. 462). By 2018, there 
were approximately 8,000 registered ref-
ugee-owned businesses in Turkey (Yassin 
104). Outside the camps, Turkish CSOs are 
a main source of assistance for Syrians 
(Mackreath and Sağnıç 2).
In 2016, the EU-Turkey deal promised 
Turkey 3€ billion in return for preventing 
illegal migrants reaching Europe and 
improving the living conditions of Syrians 
internally (Singh 10). Government policies 
shifted toward supporting integration in 
education and the labor market (Cloeters 
et al. 11) and in that same year President 
Erdoğan announced that Syrians in Turkey 
meeting certain requirements could 
receive Turkish citizenship (Şimşek 177).
No similar shift toward integration or 
improving living conditions occurred in 
Lebanon. The Lebanese government still 
refuses to acknowledge the presence of 
refugees on its land, labeling Syrian refu-
gees as “temporarily displaced individu-
als” (Janmyr 7). When their numbers sur-
passed one million, it ordered UNHCR to 
suspend registration of additional refu-
gees and thus resulting in increased illegal 
migration and worsening living conditions 
for illegal refugees (Janmyr 18; Shamieh 
60; Kabbanji and Kabbanji 27). Syrians can 
reside in Lebanon only if they are spon-
sored by a Lebanese citizen as economic 
migrants in a very limited number of occu-
pations,3 or if they possess a UNHCR reg-
istration certificate (Janmyr 15). The 
Lebanese government has been criticized 
for redirecting developmental aid to sup-
port Lebanese benefactors instead of 
Syrian refugees (Kabbanji and Kabbanji 
32), for discouraging income-generating 
projects to prevent settlement and inte-
gration, and for prohibiting UNHCR from 
building permanent refugee camps 
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(Kabbanji and Kabbanji 13; Chatty 20; 
Yassin et al. 37). 
Compared to Lebanon, Turkey’s manage-
ment of the refugee crisis evinced greater 
respect for the dignity of the refugees as 
well as for their agency (Chatty 30). 
However, studies show that displaced 
Syrians in both countries suffer from nega-
tive social attitudes toward them and 
exploitation in the labor market and hence 
resulting in informal employment and low 
wages that place many families below the 
poverty line  (Semerci and Erdoğan 26; 
Şimşek 7; Shamieh 64). This forces families 
to resort to negative coping strategies 
which include child labor as well as child 
marriage which has quadrupled among 
some Syrian refugee communities com-
pared to before 2011 (Yassin 23; Kivilcim 
201; Woods 20). 
In Turkey, the language barrier and admin-
istrative bureaucracy limit the ability of 
Syrians to benefit from rights awarded to 
them by the government as well as caus-
ing further challenges in education and 
work (Cantekin 202; Knappert et al. 70; 
Çelik and İçduygu 258; Woods 9). In, 
Lebanon living conditions are far worse. 
Syrians experience food, water and hous-
ing insecurity while living in informal 
tented settlements or other forms of sub-
standard shelters under threat of eviction. 
They suffer from arbitrary curfews (Chatty 
24), verbal and physical harassment 
(Alsharabati et al. 16), kidnapping by pro-
Syrian Lebanese government militias 
(Fourn 5), and major bureaucratic and 
financial obstacles to registering new 
births (Yassin 52) or obtaining residency 
and work permits (Civil Society Knowledge 
Centre, „Formal Informality, Brokering 
Mechanisms, and Illegality“ 20), along with 
limited access to education (Yassin 81) and 
health services (Shamieh 65).  
Syrian CSOs in Lebanon & Turkey
In 2010, some one thousand active Syrian 
CSOs were providing financial assistance 
and social services to 10 percent of the 
Syrian population (Al-Khoury et al. 4). Most 
of these were concentrated in urban cen-
ters providing mainly healthcare support, 
while financial support was a main activity 
in deprived rural areas. More than half of 
these CSOs were established from 2000 
to 2010, stimulated by government poli-
cies to develop the sector (Al-Khoury et al. 
5) alongside deregulatory market policies 
moving Syria in the direction of a Social 
Market Economy (World Bank, The Toll of 
War 4). 
Developmental efforts in the sphere of 
civil society were led by the Syrian presi-
dent’s wife, Asma Al-Assad, who in 2001 
established The Syria Trust for 
Development (The Trust), a local NGO 
with development projects for Syrian 
youth, children, women and rural villages 
in governorates across Syria. At all levels, 
the majority of Trust employees were 
females. The Trust provided an attractive 
working environment for highly skilled 
migrant Syrians who had lived abroad and 
returned to Syria. Speaking from personal 
observation while working at the Trust as 
a research analyst from 2008 to 2011, much 
effort was put into developing the capa-
bilities of employees through training and 
various learning opportunities. After 2011, 
there would be many Trust employees 
who would utilize these skills in other 
INGOs or in launching their own initiatives. 
A number of INGOs and UN agencies 
were operating in Syria before the conflict. 
According to Syrian law, INGOs require a 
local partner to execute projects in Syria. 
In this new phase of activity, INGO col-
laborations with Syrian CSOs including 
the Trust became more common, and 
according to Wael Sawah, author on Syrian 
civil society in an interview with Walker, 
Syrian CSOs became more diverse in their 
focus including environmental and cul-
tural activities as well as those involving 
children and women. 
Syrian CSOs underwent a second growth 
spurt after the outbreak of war in 2011. The 
numbers of new Syrian CSOs in the period 
2011-2017 exceeded that which had 
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existed in Syria since 1959. Geographically, 
they spread to other Syrian cities and 
neighboring countries (Al-Zoua’bi and 
Iyad 6). Ranging from informal commu-
nity-based organizations to professional-
ized NGOs that adopted Western NGO 
cultures, language and practices (Dixon et 
al. 112), these organizations initially focused 
on providing aid and humanitarian relief 
to meet refugee needs (Al-Zoua’bi and 
Iyad 6). Efforts gradually shifted toward 
development as the crisis continued, mir-
roring shifts in donor priorities. According 
to a 2017 mapping of Syrian CSO activity, 
around 40 percent were engaged in 
humanitarian aid and 50 percent in social 
and developmental activities (Al-Zoua’bi 
and Iyad 18) Additionally, interviewees 
often spoke of Syrian CSOs as safe spaces 
where Syrian communities in host coun-
tries can reestablish links with their com-
munity.
In 2018, Syrian women and children com-
prised 81 percent of registered refugees 
in Lebanon (Yassin 20) and 67 percent in 
Turkey (Cloeters et al. 22) and thus making 
them a main beneficiary for CSOs in these 
countries. In both Turkey and Lebanon, 
“relatively nascent” Syrian CSOs (Abu-
Assab and Nasser-Eddin 8) find them-
selves working alongside more devel-
oped local and international organizations 
addressing a wide range of social issues 
(Paker 10). Compared to the private sector, 
better employment conditions in CSOs in 
Lebanon and Turkey attract Syrians even 
when employment is informal (Fourn 8; 
Al-Zoua’bi and Iyad 6;).  
In Lebanon, a common language has 
allowed a number of Syrian cultural CSOs 
to flourish, in addition to education and 
health services that are underprovided for 
Syrian refugees. Despite their supportive 
role, many INGOs in Lebanon are per-
ceived as corrupt by Syrian refugees 
(Shamieh 66). Legal barriers prevent 
Syrians from being formally employed in 
CSOs (Fourn 10) or to register their own 
organizations. Yet Syrian CSOs do exist in 
Lebanon, operating informally within 
alternative structures such as non-profit 
private companies or functioning in an 
official capacity as Lebanese CSOs 
founded by Syrians who are also Lebanese 
passport holders. Turkey allows Syrians to 
register their CSOs (Dixon et al. 113) and to 
work in them. Relying on locally grounded 
approaches, the role of Turkish CSOs in 
facilitating integration and social cohesion 
grows as they work to counter the ethnic-
based exclusionary nature of Turkish soci-
ety by providing language courses and 
organizing events that bring both commu-
nities together (Paker 5; Cloeters et al. 26). 
However, cooperation between Syrian 
and Turkish CSOs remains limited due to 
“hierarchical relationships, language bar-
riers and cultural differences” (Mackreath 
and Sağnıç 3). 
Influence of Gender as a Social Marker
The 1973 Syrian constitution calls for gen-
der equality and removing obstacles that 
prevent Syrian women’s advancement 
(Kelly and Breslin 1). Their economic par-
ticipation was encouraged by the ruling 
Baath party policies (Abu-Assab 17), and 
the Syrian government’s ninth five-year 
plan (2001-2005) was committed to 
increasing female participation in public 
life and decision-making by 30 percent 
(Kelly and Breslin 18). Still, in 2011 the 
female labor participation rate had 
dropped from 21 percent in 2001 to 12.9 
percent in spite of improvements to wom-
en’s educational enrollment at all levels 
and a growing economy. This figure, how-
ever, should be interpreted with caution 
since it fails to capture informal employ-
ment rates among women. The rate of 
labor-force participation for men over this 
period had also declined from 81 percent 
in 2001 to 72.2 percent in 2010, thus indi-
cating a failure of the economy to absorb 
both male and female workers (SCPR 35). 
Although Syrian women were the first to 
gain voting rights in the Arab world in 
1949 (Kamla 606), little improvement fol-
lowed in their representation in parlia-
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ment across time, increasing from 9.6 to 
13.2 percent from 1997 to 2017.4 At higher 
governmental levels and in the judicial 
system, Syrian women have an even 
smaller presence (Kelly and Breslin 2) 
making it harder to enforce policies that 
promote gender inclusiveness. Syria has 
ratified the UN’s Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) with reserva-
tions in 2003 (Kelly and Breslin 2), and in 
February 2019 the country passed amend-
ments on over sixty articles from the 
Personal Status Law to improve women’s 
rights.
In 2011, Syrian women displaced in 
Lebanon and Turkey found themselves 
once again in patriarchal environments 
(Kivilcim 202; Khatib 438). Gender vio-
lence in Turkey occurs at double the rates 
in Syria (Knappert et al. 64) while tradi-
tional gender roles limit the access of 
Turkish women to leadership positions 
(Aycan 454). An intersectional study on 
the exploitation of working Syrian women 
in Turkey finds that their refugee status 
and gender intersect, subjecting them to 
a “reinforced exculsion” caused by gender 
roles in both host and home countries 
(Knappert et al. 76). Despite this, Turkey’s 
Kemalist legacy and non-discrimination 
principle in its Civil Code, which for exam-
ple prohibits polygamous marriage and 
requires the sharing of marital assets in 
divorce, allows women in Turkey to enjoy 
greater legal rights compared to women 
in Syria. A young Syrian woman living in 
Istanbul spoke of Turkish gender dynam-
ics and their influence: “We were exposed 
to another society, a more open one, a 
girl’s education is just like a boy’s and the 
quality of education here is more 
advanced.”5  
Despite the presence of an active 
Lebanese civil society focusing on sexual 
harassment and women’s rights (Abu-
Assab and Nasser-Eddin 33; Khneisser 2), 
Syrian women in Lebanon suffer exten-
sively from gender-based violence and 
exploitation, human trafficking and limited 
access to health care, thus affecting their 
health because of intersections in ethnic-
ity, gender and socioeconomic status 
(Shamieh 68; Yasmine and Moughalian 
27). 
Nevertheless, this study finds evidence of 
changing gender roles for Syrian women 
as triggered by the conflict and resulting 
displacement. Many of the Syrian women 
who were interviewed claimed to have 
experienced their first employment after 
2011 in host countries so as to financially 
support themselves and their families and 
thus becoming breadwinners or house-
hold heads.6 The absence of a male 
household-head due to war is not the sole 
driver of this phenomenon. Exploitation 
and informal employment conditions in 
both countries, as quoted in interviews, 
prevent males from alone meeting their 
family’s financial needs as was the case in 
Syria.  
Discriminatory employment practices are 
experienced by both Syrian men and 
women in host countries. However, many 
interviewed Syrian females, including top-
management position holders, spoke of 
additional challenges in balancing work 
and home responsibilities. The domestic 
role of Syrian women as primary caretaker 
remains mostly unaltered. The result is a 
double burden exacerbated by poverty 
and a lack of social networks in host coun-
tries. As the following quotes demon-
strate: 
My husband doesn’t mind if I work, 
but he wants everything perfect at 
home, children, doctors, schools, my 
husband doesn’t participate, he wants 
everything.7
Another obstacle is having children. 
We need family, or a mother in law, nur-
series are private, there are no public 
nurseries; you also need nurseries that 
are close to work. Turkish people rely 
on family to help them solve this pro-
blem. At three years old, you can put 
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them in a preschool that costs 700 TL 
a month; a typical salary is about 1600 
TL.8
Some female respondents mentioned 
changes in gender roles regarding house-
hold duties such as receiving support from 
husbands in cooking or childcare. In 
Turkey, the double burden often prevents 
married Syrian women from enrolling in 
Turkish-language classes. Typically these 
women work from home, which increases 
their isolation, or they gain employment in 
low-skilled jobs that require less language 
skills.  
Accommodating domestic gender roles 
and safety concerns drives Syrian women 
in host countries to seek opportunities in 
CSOs where better working conditions 
and hours exist. Some offer child-friendly 
spaces allowing mothers to accompany 
young children to work. Religious CSOs 
provide gender-segregated or female-
dominated working spaces perceived as 
safer by husbands or parents because 
they are less likely to suffer sexual harass-
ment or violence, making the transition 
from private to public spaces easier for 
women - as made clear by the following 
quote from a 21-year-old Syrian woman 
who works in a gender-segregated work-
space at a Turkish CSO that allows her to 
accompany her infant to work: “This is a 
child-friendly space, a space that is safe for 
women and children.”9
Other studies have also documented sim-
ilar double-burden challenges faced by 
Syrian women who began working after 
the crisis (El-Masri et al. 14; Abu-Assab 23). 
Civil society’s focus on Syrian women and 
children creates a demand for female 
rather than male employees. In Turkey, 
interviewed CSO managers stated that 
Syrian female beneficiaries prefer to deal 
with female rather than male staff. Donor 
policies demanding female participation 
across organizational levels with funding 
preconditions further reinforces the 
employment of Syrian women in CSOs. 
Among CSOs that I visited in Lebanon and 
Turkey, female employees were the clear 
majority. Similarly, Fourn notes that in 
Syrian CSOs in Lebanon: 
We did not observe blatant gender 
disparities in favor of men within any 
of the NGOs we studied. On the con-
trary, women are very well represented 
in leading positions, in stark contrast to 
most economic sectors. Some associa-
tions dedicated to women have almost 
only female staff (Fourn 11).
The growing presence of Syrian women at 
the workplace and the importance of their 
role as breadwinner in host countries after 
the war is also being reflected in contem-
porary Syrian art. One such example is the 
artwork above by Syrian artist Mohamad 
Khayata titiled The Giant Worker. The 
exaggerated size of the Syrian female 
worker in the artwork is a reflection of their 
growing visibility and importance to their 
communities as they work to support 
themselves and their families.
Influences of Ethnicity/Nationality-
Identity Social Markers 
In Turkey, an “Arab” ethnic identity is 
grounds for discriminatory behavior 
against Syrians (Chatty 27). Turkey’s “ethnic 
nationalism exclusively based on 
Fig. 1: The Giant Worker. Source: Mohamad 
Khayata.
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Turkishness” (Aras and Köni 48) creates 
barriers for Syrian Arabs who are seen as 
culturally different, backward, dirty, poor, 
beggars, abusers of the welfare state and 
a threat to security and employment (Çelik 
and İçduygu 255; Chatty 27; Yavçan 168; 
Paker 5). The guest debate, grounded in 
religious duty or conditional charity 
instead of human rights, has been criti-
cized for worsening the problem (Chatty 
21; Yavçan 167; Semerci and Erdoğan 29) 
as demonstrated by the following quote:
While doing official procedures, if you 
just speak two words in Turkish they 
transform and respect you a lot. They 
really like Arabs who have learned Tur-
kish, otherwise they are very clearly ra-
cist, they don’t hide it.10
Syrians working in Turkish CSOs expressed 
hope that promotion and better pay 
would become possible once they 
received Turkish citizenship. They also 
expressed desires to found their own 
CSOs one day. In light of Turkey’s current 
arbitrary and class-based citizenship pol-
icy (Şimşek 1), this desire to create and 
head an CSO can be also understood as a 
means of surpassing ethnic discrimination 
that prohibits them from accessing leader-
ship positions within Turkish CSOs. For 
undocumented Syrians, involvement in 
CSOs occurs only as informal employ-
ment, as the following quote demon-
strates: “I am not an official employee here 
because I do not have official papers, so 
I’m not entitled to a raise in salary or a 
bonus.”11
In Lebanon a complicated political history 
with Syria and perceived competition over 
jobs, housing, health, and education ser-
vices has resulted in official discriminatory 
policies and social responses against 
Syrian nationals that extend to civil society. 
Lebanese CSOs openly express a prefer-
ence for recruiting Lebanese staff even 
when their beneficiaries are mostly 
Syrians, as demonstrated by the following 
quote from the founder of a Lebanese 
CSO providing services to Syrian refu-
gees: “We have no Syrian employees; we 
want to empower the Lebanese commu-
nity so they get benefits.”12
Socioeconomic Class & Syrian CSO Elitism 
Socioeconomic class13 influences the offi-
cial status of Syrians in host countries and 
their participation in civil society. This is 
more clearly visible in Lebanon where 
Syrians with second passports and those 
who can afford legal assistance are able to 
overcome bureaucratic barriers and 
secure residency permits or register CSOs, 
while Syrians at the other end of the social 
spectrum live in dire conditions with few 
rights and little hope of securing CSO 
employment opportunities. In Turkey, edu-
cated wealthy Syrians can afford to estab-
lish their own businesses and CSOs; they 
also face fewer difficulties in obtaining 
residencies and are priority candidates for 
Turkish citizenship. 
The increasing NGOization of local CSOs 
reinforces socioeconomic differences that 
produce elitist leaderships in Syrian civil 
society. CSOs compete for funds from 
INGOs and Western governments to sur-
vive, making staff with foreign-language 
skills and NGO-related experience essen-
tial (Mackreath and Sağnıç 62; Dixon et al. 
99; Svoboda and Pantuliano 16). Generally 
speaking, within Syrian CSOs, findings 
confirm that the higher the educational 
degree the higher the position within the 
organization for both males and females.
Educational attainment among Syrians, 
however, is influenced by urban/rural dif-
ferences and gender. In 2010, 60 percent 
of the Syrian population held a primary-
school degree or less. Women were 2.5 
times more likely to be illiterate than men, 
with rural illiteracy occurring at twice the 
rate of urban areas (SCPR 34). Syrian 
women from rural areas are therefore less 
likely to have postgraduate degrees than 
their urban counterparts, and because 
civil-society organizations in Syria are con-
centrated in urban areas, namely 
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Damascus followed by Aleppo and 
Lattakia (Al-Khoury et al. 5), they are also 
less likely to have had the opportunity to 
accumulate NGO-specific experience. 
The influence of socioeconomic status on 
education and the accumulation of NGO 
skills is more evident in Lebanon. 
Prominent female Syrian leaders often 
have wealthy urban backgrounds and 
higher educational degrees from Western 
universities in development-related sub-
jects such as Gender Studies and Peace 
and Conflict Studies. Fourn confirms this 
educated urban middle-class characteris-
tic among Syrians engaged in civil-society 
work in Lebanon (4).
The language barrier in Turkey alters this 
dynamic by creating demand for Syrians 
fluent in Turkish and Arabic in Turkish 
CSOs. Management in these CSOs relies 
heavily on Syrian interpreters, teachers 
and psychologists in projects with Syrian 
beneficiaries. This creates opportunities 
for young unskilled Syrians who took 
advantage of free language courses and 
learned Turkish to accumulate CSO work 
experience, attend training sessions, sup-
port their livelihood and finance further 
education. Several Syrian women who 
were so engaged did express hopes of 
establishing their own CSOs in the future. 
For Syrian CSOs in Turkey, access to alter-
native funding from Arab countries allows 
them to bypass the complications involved 
in Western donations. With each year, they 
also develop their CSO structures and 
skills further. This is more challenging for 
young Syrians in Lebanon where access to 
higher education is restricted by legal 
issues, academic qualifications, and 
affordability (Yassin 82). 
Conclusion
This paper finds that the ongoing Syrian 
conflict and displacement have created 
conditions resulting in a greater presence 
of Syrian women in the public space as 
workers and members of civil society in 
Turkey and Lebanon. International, host 
and Syrian CSOs are key sites for this 
increased participation. This phenomenon 
is influenced by a number of external fac-
tors including the existence of better 
working conditions for women in CSOs 
compared to the private sector, higher 
demand in CSOs for female rather than 
male employees, international donor pol-
icies that support female participation, 
and opportunities for capacity develop-
ment within these organizations that allow 
unskilled Syrian women to gain experi-
ence and further advance within the sec-
tor. The ongoing Syrian conflict and con-
sequential growth of civil society has been 
a catalyst for change in Syrian women’s 
traditional gender roles. This change is 
slowly finding its way into the domestic 
sphere of Syrian families, but traditional 
gender roles persist in the majority of 
households and place a greater burden 
on women who struggle to manage both 
work and home duties. For Syrian women 
with children, involvement in civil society 
and the public sphere is even more chal-
lenging. 
For Syrian women in Turkey and Lebanon, 
this paper reveals that their socioeco-
nomic status and ethnicity/nationality 
intersect with gender to influence their 
ability to participate in civil society. It also 
demonstrates how gender studies focus-
ing solely on gender as the primary cause 
for discrimination against women can 
result in over-simplistic interpretations 
that fail to adequately capture other key 
sources of discrimination such as the situ-
ations highlighted above where socioeco-
nomic status and ethnic identity play a 
bigger role in determining participation 
than gender. 
The negative effects of these social mark-
ers are stronger in Lebanon as compared 
to Turkey, which allows Syrian women to 
work in and establish CSOs. Ethnic identity 
mainly prevents Syrian women from occu-
pying leadership positions in Turkish 
CSOs. In Lebanon, discriminatory policies 
and social practices greatly hinder the par-
ticipation of Syrian women along socio-
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economic lines and those of national iden-
tity.
It is unclear whether Syrian women can 
use their increasing presence within civil 
society to advocate collectively for greater 
gender equality and participation in all 
public spaces within host countries and in 
Syria. Evidence from my interviews shows 
that a strongly unified and representative 
feminist agenda in Syrian civil society has 
yet to materialize - as might be expected 
from a civil society that currently places a 
priority on dealing with the humanitarian 
impact of conflict rather than advocating 
greater rights for women (Abu-Assab and 
Nasser-Eddin 12). Further research is 
needed to examine the progress of Syrian 
civil organizations and the role of Syrian 
women within them as they advance their 
skills and capabilities.          
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Notes
1 Contact UNDP Syria for 
obtaining a copy of the 
report.
2 Gender here is understood 
in the socially constructed 
and dynamic sense, 
influenced by current 
evolving political and post-
Arab Spring events.
3 Decree No. 29/1 dated 
15/02/2018 Ministry of 




Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
4 Figures taken from UNDP 
estimates for Syria, see 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/
indicators/31706. Accessed 17 
Apr. 2020. 
5 Personal Interview. In-
person meeting. 27 Oct. 2018. 
6 In 2018 there were 18 
percent of Syrian households 
which were Female-headed 
(Yassin 41).
7 Group Interview. In-person 
meeting. 18 Sept. 2018.
8 Personal Interview. In-
person meeting. 19 Oct. 
2018. .  
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